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Abstract:   
This paper explores the link between poverty and inequality through an analysis of 
the poverty impact of changes in income-component inequality and in between -and 
within- group inequality. This can help shed light on the theoretical and empirical 
linkages between poverty, growth and inequality. It might also help design policies to 
improve both equity and welfare. The tools are illustrated using the recent 2004 
Nigerian national household survey. The analytically derived linkages are supported 
by the empirical illustration, and interesting insights also emerge from the empirical 
analysis. One such insight is that both the sign and the size of the elasticities can be 
quite sensitive to the choice of measurement assumptions (such as the choice of 
inequality and poverty aversion parameters, and that of the poverty line). The 
elasticities are also very much distribution-sensitive and dependent on the type of 
inequality-changing processes taking place. This also suggests that the response of 
poverty to growth can also be expected to be significantly context specific. 
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1 Introduction
The recent years have witnessed an increasingly strong interest in the im-
pact of development on poverty. An important reason for this has been the
establishment of the so-called Millennium Development Goals, which have set
poverty reduction as a fundamental objective of development. The most fre-
quently advocated manner to achieve such poverty reduction is through economic
growth. Whether growth reduces poverty, and whether in particular growth can
be deemed to be “pro-poor”, depends, however, on the impact of growth on in-
equality and on how much this impact on inequality feeds into poverty. This link
between growth and inequality has also generated considerable independent in-
terest lately — see, among many relatively recent contributions to that debate,
Bruno, Ravallion, and Squire (1998), United Nations (2000), World Bank 2000,
Eastwood and Lipton (2001), Dollar and Kraay (2002), and Bourguignon (2003).
This interest is of course reminiscent of the sempiternal debate on the ex-
istence of a Kuznets (1956) inverted U-shape relationship between growth and
inequality. It has more recently been mixed with the issue of how glob-
alization affects poverty and inequality — see inter alia World Bank (2002),
Watkins (2002) and Heshmati (2004). Some recent empirical studies, such as
Deininger and Squire (1998) and Frazer (2006), have tended to conclude that
there exists little support for the Kuznets hypothesis, suggesting, as we ex-
plore in this paper, that the relationship may be more complex and more het-
erogeneous than is sometimes thought. This is also supported by the view of
Dollar and Kraay (2002) that although, on average, growth may have a neutral
impact on inequality, this impact exhibits considerable variability across time and
space.
A closely related issue is whether we should be normatively interested in the
impact of growth on absolute poverty or on relative inequality. This issue is at
the heart of the debate surrounding the conceptual definition of “pro-poorness”
— see, for instance, McCulloch and Baulch (1999), Kakwani and Pernia (2000),
Ravallion and Datt (2002), Kakwani, Khandker, and Son (2003),
Ravallion and Chen (2003), Klasen (2003), Son (2004) and Essama-Nssah (2005)
for recent contributions to that conceptual definition. The debate essentially
involves the confrontation of different value judgments, and as such there does
not seem to be a generally acceptable solution to it other than saying that both
poverty and inequality can be of concern to analysts. Because of this, the
link between poverty and inequality should also be of interest from a policy
perspective. Are there changes in inequality that would be particularly effective at
2
reducing poverty? Are there policies that would be good at reducing both poverty
and inequality? A major objective of this paper is to provide tools to help answer
such questions.
The link between growth, inequality and poverty is also particularly impor-
tant from a dynamic perspective. The recent World Development Report of the
World Bank (2005) encapsulated one aspect of this link in the phrase “inequal-
ity traps”, by which it is meant that inequality may be self-reinforcing, hindering
growth, and hampering poverty reduction in the longer term:
“The existence of these inequality traps — with mutually reinforcing
inequalities in economic, political, social, and cultural domains —
has two main implications for this analysis. The first implication is
that, because of market failures and of the ways in which institutions
evolve, inequality traps can affect not only the distribution but also the
aggregate dynamics of growth and development. This in turn means
that, in the long run, equity and efficiency may be complements, not
substitutes.” (World Bank 2005, p.22)
This suggests that it may be appropriate to look at the combined effect of policy
on — and at the joint evolution of — poverty and relative inequality even if we
are normatively interested only in long-term absolute poverty alleviation.
We may finally be interested in the link between inequality and poverty for
purely descriptive or accounting purposes. For instance, how do changing dispar-
ities between regions or socio-demographic groups help explain the evolution of
poverty? How are changes in inequality within these groups impacting poverty?
How can poverty changes be linked to changes in the distribution of factor in-
comes — such as changes in the composition of wage earners and self-employed
workers, for instance, or changes in factor prices — both between and within
socio-economic categories? Concerns are indeed often voiced that widening dis-
parities across space (e.g., involving coastal vs inner regions, or urban vs rural
areas) or increasing inequality between and within groups (e.g., skilled vs un-
skilled workers, formal vs informal workers) may be pushing up poverty, or at
least dampening the impact of growth on poverty. Again, the paper provides tools
to help examine such issues.
The overall aim of this paper is thus to develop an analytical micro framework
with which to probe into some of the complex and context-specific linkages that
exist between poverty and inequality. One of the paper’s important results is to
bring out the importance of making precise what type of inequality we have in
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mind when we attempt to link poverty, inequality and growth. Another outcome
is to help simulate the potential impact of economic shocks and economic policies
on both poverty and inequality.
To achieve this, the paper derives a variety of elasticities of poverty and
inequality with respect to various types of distributive changes. This is con-
ceptually analogous to, but methodologically different from, the assessment
of the contribution of growth and changes in inequality to the evolution of
poverty in Datt and Ravallion (1992), Kakwani (1997), Shorrocks (1999) and
Araar and Awoyemi (2006), for instance; the paper’s analytical developments also
extend those of Kakwani (1993).
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents an analytical deriva-
tion of the poverty and inequality impact of different sources of distributive
changes, all of them leading to increases in some types of inequality. We con-
sider two main sources of such changes: changes in the inequality of socio-
economic groups, and changes in the inequality of income components — see also
Essama-Nssah and Lambert (2006) and Son (2006) for recent — though method-
ologically different — attempts to track the impact of changes in income compo-
nents on the pro-poorness of growth. For each of these sources of variations in
inequality, we consider both “within” and “between” changes in inequality. We
also consider changes in income-component inequality that affect only those in-
dividuals that are effectively active in some economic sector — as opposed to
changes that affect everyone’s income from that sector. This provides a rich set
of contexts in which to analyze the relationship between poverty and inequality.
Section 3 then applies the analytical methods to a recent survey of incomes in a
large developing country, Nigeria, in which both poverty alleviation and inequal-
ity reduction form important elements of the strategy towards the achievement of
the Millennium Development Goals. Section 4 summarizes the main results of the
paper.
2 Poverty and inequality elasticities
2.1 Notation
Let incomes be non-negative and distributed according to the distribution func-
tion F (y), assumed for expositional simplicity to be continuous and with density
function f(y). A quantile function Q(p) is then defined implicitly as F (Q(p)) ≡
p, or, using the inverse distribution function, as Q(p) = F−1(p). Q(p) is thus the
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income below which we find a proportion p of the population; it is also the in-
come at percentile p in the population. Let µ be overall average income, namely,
µ =
∫
Q(p)dp. The Lorenz curve L(p), which gives the proportion of total in-
come that accrues to the poorest p proportion of the population, is then defined
as
L(p) = µ−1
∫ p
0
Q(q)dq, (1)
and the (ordinary) Gini index is given by:
I = 2
∫ 1
0
(p− L(p))dp. (2)
Equation (2) uses the well-known definition of the Gini as twice the area be-
tween the line of perfect equality, p, and the actual Lorenz curve, L(p). One can,
however, also think of percentile-dependent weights to aggregate the distances
p − L(p). A popular one-parameter functional specification for such weights is
given by κ(p; ρ) = ρ(ρ − 1)(1 − p)ρ−2 and depends on the value of a single nor-
mative parameter ρ. That parameter must be greater than 1 for the weights to
be positive everywhere. We then obtain the class of Single-Parameter Gini (or
S-Gini) indices as1
I(ρ) =
∫ 1
0
(p− L(p))κ(p; ρ)dp. (3)
Yaari (1988) defines “an indicator for the policy maker’s degree of equality mind-
edness at p” as (ρ− 1)(1− p)−1. The larger the value of ρ, the greater the ’mind-
edness’ for equality, the relatively larger the value of κ(p; ρ) for small p, and
therefore the greater the relative weight attributed to the distances between p and
L(p) at lower values of p. Let ω(p; ρ) then be defined as
ω(p; ρ) =
∫ 1
p
κ(q; ρ)dq = ρ(1− p)ρ−1. (4)
Integration by parts of (3) leads to
I(ρ) = µ−1
∫ 1
0
(µ−Q(p))ω(p; ρ)dp, (5)
1These were introduced by Donaldson and Weymark (1980), Kakwani (1980),
Donaldson and Weymark (1983), and Yitzhaki (1983); see also Duclos and Araar (2006),
Section 4.2, for a discussion of the some of the properties of these indices.
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and a special case of (5) is the ordinary Gini index of (2):
I(2) =
2
µ
∫ 1
0
(µ−Q(p))(1− p)dp. (6)
Let (1−Q(p)/z)+ = max(0, (1−Q(p)/z)) be the normalized poverty gap at
p. The Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (1984) (FGT) class of poverty indices is then
defined as
P (z;α) =
∫ 1
0
(
z −Q(p)
z
)α
+
dp (7)
for a poverty line z and a “poverty-aversion” parameter α. It is well known that the
popular poverty headcount and average poverty gap indices are given respectively
by α = 0 and α = 1. The best-known inequality and poverty indices are thus
particular members of the S-Gini and FGT classes of indices in (5) and (7). This
explains why we focus on these classes in this paper. Note that both of these
classes are normatively flexible since they incorporate an inequality and a poverty
aversion parameter that can be varied by analysts. One outcome of the paper is
indeed to see how the link between poverty and inequality is sensitive to such
aversion parameters.
2.2 Changes in inequality
Changing the S-Gini index by 1%, say, can be done in a very large number
of ways, each of them involving different transformations of the original income
distribution. It can be seen for instance from (5) that changes in I(ρ) can come
from distributive changes at the top of the income scale (large Q(p)), at the bottom
(low Q(p)), or from changes involving both low and large incomes. This also
means that a 1% change in inequality can be expected to generate many different
impacts on poverty, depending on the precise nature of the distributive change that
leads to it. In general, therefore, it does not seem appropriate to think of poverty
and inequality as being linked deterministically across time or space. This is in
fact one of the main (and, for micro-data analysts, somewhat obvious) lessons
explored in this paper: a given change in inequality is compatible with many
different possible changes in poverty. In fact, even if we restrict considerably and
parameterize the type of distributive changes allowed to generate this 1% change
in inequality — as we do below — the link between poverty and inequality still
remains very heterogeneous and will depend inter alia on the precise nature of the
change in inequality that is being considered.
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A general type of distributive change that can be handled nicely from an an-
alytical perspective spreads all incomes away from the mean by a proportional
factor λ. It corresponds, roughly speaking, to an increased bipolarization of in-
comes away from an unchanged mean — see for instance Wolfson (1994) and
Duclos and E´chevin (2005). Such bipolarization is equivalent to adding (λ −
1)(Q(p) − µ) to each Q(p), in such a way that the post-bipolarization p-quantile
equals:
Q(p;λ) = Q(p) + (λ− 1) (Q(p)− µ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
increased bipolarization
. (8)
Note that this bipolarization does not affect average income since:∫ 1
0
Q(p;λ)dp =
∫ 1
0
[Q(p) + (λ− 1) (Q(p)− µ)] dp = µ. (9)
The post bipolarization Lorenz curve is moved by a factor proportional to the
distance between the line of perfect equality, p, and the initial Lorenz curve:
L(p;λ) = L(p)− (λ− 1) (p− L(p))︸ ︷︷ ︸
increased bipolarization
. (10)
The post-bipolarization S-Gini index is then given by
I(ρ;λ) = µ−1
∫ 1
0
λ(µ−Q(p))ω(p; ρ)dp, (11)
and it thus follows that
∂I(ρ;λ)
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
λ=1
= I(ρ;λ). (12)
At λ = 1, the bipolarization derivative of the S-Gini index is thus simply the
S-Gini index itself.
2.3 Changes in poverty
The impact of bipolarization on FGT poverty is not as straightforward as in
(12). To see why, first define P (z;α;λ) as poverty after the change in bipolariza-
tion:
P (z;α;λ) =
∫ 1
0
(
z −Q(p;λ)
z
)α
+
dp. (13)
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The poverty impact of a change in λ can then be shown to be given by:
∂P (z;α;λ)
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
λ=1
=
 α
[
P (z;α) +
(
µ−z
z
)
P (z;α− 1)] if α > 0
f(z)(µ− z) if α = 0.
(14)
Kakwani (1993) first derived this result; see also Duclos and Araar (2006) and
Appendix 1 of this paper for an alternative demonstration. The sign of (14) de-
pends on whether z exceeds µ or not. There are three cases:
1. For µ > z, (14) is unambiguously positive whatever the value of α.
2. For µ = z, (14) is zero for α = 0 and positive otherwise.
3. For µ < z, (14) is clearly negative for α = 0. For greater values of α, note
that (14) can be rewritten as:
αz−α
∫ 1
0
[(µ− z) + (z −Q(p))](z −Q(p))α−1+ dp (15)
= αz−α
∫ 1
0
(µ−Q(p))(z −Q(p))α−1+ dp (16)
= αz−αcov
(
µ−Q(p), (z −Q(p))α−1+
)
(17){
> 0 if α ≥ 1
>−
< 0 if α < 1.
(18)
In a very poor society, for which µ < z, decreasing the S-Gini will move some of
those above µ into poverty and will thus increase the poverty headcount. As (18)
indicates, an increase in inequality can also increase P (z;α) whenever α < 1.
To see better why this is so, consider Figure 1. The contribution of different
quantiles Q(p) to total poverty is shown for different values of α. That contribu-
tion is nil for quantiles Q(p) exceeding z. It is always non increasing with Q(p).
Depending on the value of α, the contribution can be convex (when α ≥ 1) or
sometimes concave in Q(p) (for lower values of α). Because of this, and depend-
ing on the value of the incomes that are spread further from each other, poverty
can either increase or decrease.
When increased bipolarization is applied to incomes in an area over which the
contributions in Figure 1 are convex, poverty increases2; otherwise, poverty can
2As is always the case with α > 1 since the covariance in (17) is then positive.
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decrease. For instance, with α < 1, the curve in Figure 1 has two areas, one over
which increased bipolarization reduces poverty — when increased bipolarization
involves only the poor, and especially so if the richer of the poor then cross the
poverty line — and another area over which increased bipolarization increases
poverty (whenever increased bipolarization transfers involves a poor and a non-
poor).3
Hence, even in the very simple case just considered, the impact on poverty
of a change in inequality depends on initial conditions — namely, on the initial
distribution of income and on whether z exceeds mean income — and on the way
in which poverty is measured. The elasticity of FGT poverty with respect to the
S-Gini is then obtained as
ελ(z;α; ρ) =
∂P (z;α;λ)/∂λ
∂I(ρ;λ)/∂λ
I(ρ;λ)
P (z;α;λ)
∣∣∣∣
λ=1
, (19)
which, using (12) and (14), leads to
ελ(z;α; ρ) =
{
α
[
1 +
(
µ−z
z
)
P (z;α−1)
P (z;α)
]
if α > 0,
f(z)
F (z)
(µ− z) if α = 0.
(20)
As for (14), the sign of (20) depends on the values of z and α and on the distri-
bution of incomes. The numerical value of (20) now also depends on the initial
value of P (z;α), another source of variability across distributions. Note also that
this particular type of elasticity does not explicitly depend on the initial value of
I(ρ).
2.4 Poverty and inequality within and between groups
To consider the impact of changes in within-group inequality, let g = 1, ..., G
denote G exclusive and exhaustive socio-demographic groups (differentiated by
regions of residence or by family characteristics, for instance) and let φ(p; g) be
the proportion of those individuals at percentile p that belong to group g. This
proportion is naturally bounded between 0 and 1. For example, if there were only
two groups in a discrete population, noted by A and B, and 5 individuals located
at some percentile p, two of them belonging to group A and the three others to
3Note that the sign of (16) depends on the sign of
∫ F (z)
0
[(µ − Q(p))]ς(p)dp, where ς(p) =
(z − Q(p))α−1. When α = 1, we have that ς(p) = 1 ∀p and (16) is greater than zero since
µ > F (z)−1
∫ F (z)
0
Q(p)dp.
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group B, then we would have φ(p;A) = 0.40 and φ(p;B) = 0.60. The overall
share of group g in the population is φ(g) =
∫
φ(p; g)dp. The mean income of
group g is then denoted as
µ(g) = φ(g)−1
∫ 1
0
Q(p)φ(p; g)dp (21)
and the overall mean is obtained as
µ =
G∑
g=1
∫ 1
0
Q(p)φ(p; g)dp. (22)
2.4.1 Within-group inequality
Within-group-g bipolarization spreads Q(p) away from µ(g) for those who
belong to group g. This can be, for instance, caused by changes in the dispersion
of physical and humain assets within a group as well as by changes in the returns
to these assets. To see the effect of this, let σ(g) be a group-g-specific factor of
bipolarization and let Q(p; g;σ(g)) be the expected post-bipolarization income of
those in group g that were initially at percentile p in the overall distribution of
income. Then,
Q(p; g;σ(g)) = Q(p) + (σ(g)− 1) (Q(p)− µ(g)) . (23)
Note that this scheme does not affect between-group inequality since average in-
come µ(g) remains the same for all groups, whatever the value of σ(g):
φ(g)−1
∫
[Q(p) + (σ(g)− 1) (Q(p)− µ(g))]φ(p; g)dp = µ(g). (24)
The expected income of those initially at p is given by
Q(p;φ(g))) = Q(p) (1− φ(p; g)) +Q(p; g;φ(g))φ(p; g). (25)
Now denote as I(ρ;σ(g)) the overall S-Gini after the bipolarisation factor σ(g)
has been applied to the within-group-g distribution of income:
I(ρ;σ(g)) =
µ−1
∫
[µ− (Q(p) + (σ(g)− 1)(Q(p)− µ(g)))φ(p; g)]ω(p; ρ)dp. (26)
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The impact on total inequality of a marginal increase in within-group-g inequality
is then obtained as
∂I(ρ; σ(g))
∂σ(g)
∣∣∣∣
σ(g)=1
= µ−1
∫ 1
0
(µ(g)−Q(p))ω(p; ρ)φ(p; g)dp (27)
=
φ(g)µ(g)
µ
IC (ρ; g) (28)
where
IC (ρ; g) = (φ(g)µ(g))−1
∫ 1
0
(µ(g)−Q(p))ω(p; ρ)φ(p; g)dp (29)
is the “coefficient of concentration”4 of group g obtained by setting to µ(g), in (5),
the incomes of all those who do not belong to group g, and by normalizing (29)
by φ(g)µ(g) — which is the contribution of group g to overall mean income.
Now denote by P (z;α; g) the FGT index for group g, formally defined as
P (z;α; g) = φ(g)−1
∫ 1
0
(
z −Q(p)
z
)α
+
φ(p; g)dp. (30)
P (z;α; g;σ(g)) is obtained from (30) by replacing Q(p) by Q(p; σ(g)). Total
FGT poverty being given by
P (z;α;σ(g)) =
∑
g
φ(g)P (z;α; g; σ(g)), (31)
we therefore have that
∂P (z;α; σ(g))
∂σ(g)
= φ(g)
∂P (z;α; g;σ(g))
∂σ(g)
. (32)
Letting f(g; z) be the density of group g at z, we find:
∂P (z;α; σ(g))
∂σ(g)
∣∣∣∣
σ(g)=1
= (33)
αφ(g)
[
P (z;α; g) +
(
µ(g)−z
z
)
P (z;α− 1; g)
]
if α > 0,
φ(g)f(z; g)(µ(g)− z) if α = 0.
(34)
4See for example Sections 7.2 and 7.3 of Duclos and Araar (2006) for an introduction to con-
centration curves and S-Gini concentration indices.
11
Using (28) and (34), the elasticity of total poverty with respect to within-group
inequality is then given by
εσ(g)(z;α; ρ) =
∂P (z;α; σ(g))/∂σ(g)
∂I(ρ; σ(g))/∂σ(g)
I(ρ;σ(g))
P (z;α;σ(g))
∣∣∣∣
σ(g)=1
. (35)
Note that the same comments as for (14) and (19) apply to the interpretation of the
value of (35) — namely, that the sign and the magnitude of εσ(g)(z;α; ρ) depend
on α, z − µ(g) and the distribution of income in group g. Denoting by σ the case
in which the same σ(g) is applied simultaneously to all groups, we then have
εσ(z;α; ρ) =
∂P (z;α;σ)/∂σ
∂I(ρ;σ)/∂σ
I(ρ;σ)
P (z;α;σ)
∣∣∣∣
σ=1
. (36)
2.4.2 Between-group inequality
We now consider the impact of a bipolarization process that spreads groups
apart from each other without affecting within-group inequality. This change
could come, for instance, from widening disparities across space — such as those
between coastal and inner regions, urban and rural areas — or across groups —
such as disparities between skilled and unskilled workers, or formal and infor-
mal workers. To model this, we keep constant both within-group inequality and
overall mean income by setting a between-group bipolarization factor γ(g) as a
function of a scalar γ (common to all γ(g)):
γ(g)− 1 = 1 + (γ − 1)
(
1− µ
µ(g)
)
. (37)
Expected post-bipolarization income for those initially at p and in group g is then
given by
Q(p; g; γ) = Q(p)(γ(g)− 1) (38)
= Q(p)
(
1 + (γ − 1)
(
1− µ
µ(g)
))
. (39)
Note that such between-group bipolarisation does not affect within-group inequal-
ity since (38) amounts to multiplying all incomes in a group g by the same scalar
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(γ(g)− 1). We also find for all values of γ that
G∑
g=1
∫
Q(p; g; γ)φ(p; g)dp =
G∑
g=1
φ(g)µ(g)
[
1 + (γ − 1)(µ(g)− µ)
µ(g)
]
(40)
=
[
µ+ (γ − 1)
G∑
g=1
φ(g) (µ(g)− µ)
]
= µ, (41)
which confirms that such between-group polarization keeps overall mean income
constant. Note that with this γ scheme, the average income of group g can be
written as
µ(g; γ) = µ(g)
(
1 + (γ − 1)
(
1− µ
µ(g)
))
= µ(g) + (γ − 1) (µ(g)− µ) . (42)
Equation (42) shows that the impact of γ on average group income is similar to the
impact of bipolarisation on incomes presented in equation (8). Clearly, increasing
γ thus increases between-group inequality. I(ρ; γ) is then given by
I(ρ; γ) = µ−1
G∑
g=1
∫ 1
0
[µ−Q(p; g; γ)]φ(p; g)ω(p; ρ)dp (43)
The impact of a change in γ on the S-Gini can then be derived as5:
∂I(ρ; γ)
∂γ
∣∣∣∣
γ=1
= IC (ρ) +
G∑
g=1
φ(g)
(
µ(g)
µ
− 1
)
IC (ρ; g), (44)
where IC (ρ; g) is as in (29) and IC (ρ) is the coefficient of concentration obtained
when everyone is assigned his group income:
IC (ρ) = µ−1
G∑
g=1
∫ 1
0
(µ− µ(g))ω(p; ρ)φ(p; g)dp. (45)
IC (ρ) is thus an index of between-group inequality.
Note that if all individuals within a given group are identical, (44) reduces
to (12). If within-group inequality is not zero, however, then we must also take
5See Appendix 2 for a demonstration.
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into account its role (through IC (ρ; g)). (45) implicitly assumes that all incomes
within a group are changed by the same absolute value, which is equivalent to
assuming no within-group inequality. Increasing between-group bipolarization
has instead the effect of increasing everyone’s income by the same proportion
γ(g)−1. In the presence of within-group inequality, higher incomes in a group are
therefore affected absolutely more, and lower incomes less, than what is captured
by (45). For µ(g) < µ, this has the effect of decreasing inequality, and the reverse
for µ(g) > µ. The net effect of this is captured by
∑G
g=1 φ(g)
(
µ(g)
µ
− 1
)
IC (ρ; g).
Figure 2 contains an illustrative example of how between-group bi-polarization
affects inequality and poverty. The continuous lines in Panel A show the initial
density functions within each of two subgroups. These densities are moved to
the short-dashed lines with the increase in between-group inequality6. Since these
movements change within-group inequality, a second adjustment is required to
keep within-group inequality unchanged; this is shown by the movement from the
short-dashed to the long-dashed lines of Panel A. For the group to the left of Panel
A, this movement to a long-dashed line decreases inequality; the converse is true
for the group to the right of Panel A. As shown in Panel B of Figure 2, and as noted
analytically above in (44), these movements have opposite effects on inequality.
The poverty impact of such between-group bipolarisation equals7:
∂P (z;α; γ)
∂γ
= (46) α
∑G
g=1 φ(g)
(
µ
µ(g)
− 1
)
[zP (z;α− 1; g)− P (z;α; g)] if α > 0∑G
g=1 φ(g)
(
µ
µ(g)
− 1
)
f(z; g) if α = 0.
(47)
The elasticity of total poverty with respect to between-group bipolarization is then
denoted by εγ(z;α; ρ) and is defined by
εγ(z;α; ρ) =
∂P (z;α; γ)/∂γ
∂I(ρ; γ)/∂γ
I(ρ; γ)
P (z;α; γ)
∣∣∣∣
γ=1
. (48)
The poverty impact of between-group bipolarization is thus qualitatively am-
biguous, depending in particular on the relation of average group incomes µ(g) to
6The same constant amount c is added (or subtracted) for each group; as shown by
Araar (2006), this has the effect of changing the Gini by − cµI .
7See Appendix 3 for a demonstration.
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overall average income, and on within-group poverty P (z;α; g). This can again
be seen in Panel B of Figure 2, where between-group bipolarization and the move-
ment from the continuous to the dashed line generate two conflicting effects on
the headcount.
2.5 Poverty and inequality in income components
Now consider the joint impact on inequality and poverty of changes in the
inequality of income components (or income sources). To do this, first suppose
that the sum of a total number K of income components equals total income and
that the expected amount of income component k found at percentile p is denoted
by s(p; k). We have that
Q(p) =
K∑
k=1
s(p; k). (49)
The overall mean of income component k is then given by µ(k) =
∫
s(p; k)dp.
Note that s(p; k) can be increasing or decreasing with p (and can even be negative
if component k is a tax or a capital income loss for instance).
2.5.1 Within-component inequality
Increasing the bipolarization of income component k amounts to increasing
the distance between overall mean component and the individual value of all in-
come components. This is also obtained by adding (η(k)− 1)(µ(k)− s(p; k)) to
s(p; k) in such a way that expected income at percentile p becomes
Q(p; η(k)) = Q(p) + (η(k)− 1) (s(p; k)− µ(k)) . (50)
Examples of the sources of such a change are increased dispersions in the inequal-
ity of the distribution of human (education, experience, ability) or of physical
capital. We then have:
I(ρ; η(k)) = µ−1
∫
[µ− (Q(p) + (η(k)− 1)(s(p; k)− µ(k)))]ω(p; ρ)dp. (51)
The impact on inequality of a change in η(k) is then
∂I(ρ; η(k))
∂η(k)
∣∣∣∣
η(k)=1
= ψ(k)IC (ρ; k), (52)
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where ψ(k) = µ(k)/µ is the share of income component k in total income and
IC (ρ; k) is the usual coefficient of concentration of component k:
IC (ρ; k) = µ(k)−1
∫
(s(p; k)− µ(k))ω(p; ρ)dp. (53)
Letting
P (z;α; η(k)) =
∫ 1
0
(
z −Q(p; η(k))
z
)α
+
dp, (54)
the impact on total poverty of within-component increased bipolarization is then8
∂P (z;α; η(k))
∂η(k)
=
{
αz−1µ(k)
[
P (z;α− 1)− CD(z;α; k)] if α > 0
−f(z)(s(F (z); k)− µ(k)) if α = 0, (55)
whereCD(z;α; k) is Makdissi and Wodon (2002)’s normalized consumption-dominance
curve for component k:
CD(z;α; k) =
∫ 1
0
(
z −Q(p)
z
)α−1
+
s(p; k)
µ(k)
dp. (56)
Note that CD(z;α; k) is an average of the percentile share, s(p; k)/µ(k), of com-
ponent k times poverty gaps to the power α− 1. As for (14), (55) can be positive
or negative, depending on z, α, µ(k), and the distribution of s(p; k). In particular,
the sign of the impact on the poverty headcount (α = 0) depends on the differ-
ence between the expected level of income component k at the poverty line and
the overall mean value of that component. If s(F (z); k) exceeds µ(k), the head-
count will fall following an increase in the inequality of component k. That would
occur, for instance, if an increase in the bipolarization of farm income applied to a
distribution in which some of the not-so-poor poor had greater farm income than
average farm income — a situation that is plausible.
The elasticity of total poverty with respect to within-component inequality is
then denoted as εη(k)(z;α; ρ) and is defined as
εη(k)(z;α; ρ) =
∂P (z;α; η(k))/∂η(k)
∂I(ρ; η(k))/∂η(k)
I(ρ; η(k))
P (z;α; η(k))
∣∣∣∣
η(k)=1
(57)
8See Appendix 4 for a demonstration.
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Note that a scheme η obtained by applying the same η(k) to all income compo-
nents is equivalent to the scheme λ in (8) since
Q(p; η) = Q(p) + (η − 1)
K∑
k=1
(s(p; k)− µ(k)) (58)
= Q(p) + (η − 1) (Q(p)− µ) . (59)
We then have that
εη(z;α; ρ) ≡ ελ(z;α; ρ). (60)
2.5.2 Between-component inequality
Increased between-component inequality is generated by an increase in the
bipolarisation of average income components without changing within-component
inequality. Changes in relative consumption and factor prices can produce this
naturally. To model this process while keeping overall mean constant, we define
a component-specific factor τ(k) of change in the average of component k,
τ(k)− 1 = 1 + (τ − 1)
(
1− µ/K
µ(k)
)
, (61)
and we obtain the expected value of post-bipolarization component k at percentile
p as
s(p; k)
(
1 + (τ − 1)
(
1− µ/K
µ(k)
))
. (62)
Multiplying s(p; k) by a factor that is independent of p maintains constant within-
component-k inequality. The expected incomes of those initially at percentile p
then become
Q(p; τ) = Q(p) +
K∑
k=1
s(p; k)
(
(τ − 1)
(
1− µ/K
µ(k)
))
. (63)
Using the common factor τ also maintains constant the value of overall mean
income since by (63) we have∫ 1
0
Q(p; τ)dp = µ+
K∑
k=1
(τ − 1)
(
1− µ/K
µ(k)
)∫ 1
0
s(p; k)dp (64)
= µ+ (τ − 1)
K∑
k=1
(
µ(k)− µ
K
)
= µ. (65)
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With this scheme, the mean of income component k becomes
µ(k; τ) = µ(k)
(
1 + (τ − 1)
(
1− µ/K
µ(k)
))
= µ(k) + (τ − 1) (µ(k)− µ/K) , (66)
which implies an increase in between-component analogous to (8).
The marginal impact on the S-Gini of a change in τ is then given by9:
∂I(ρ; τ)
∂τ
∣∣∣∣
τ=1
=
[
I −
K∑
k=1
IC (ρ; k)
K
]
, (67)
whereas the poverty impact of this increased bipolarisation equals10:
∂P (z;α; τ)
∂τ
∣∣∣∣
τ=1
=
 α
[
P (z;α)− P (z;α− 1) + µ
z
∑K
k=1
CD(z;α;k)
K
]
if α > 0
−f(z)∑Kk=1 s(F (z); k)(1− µ/Kµ(k)) if α = 0. (68)
The elasticity of total poverty with respect to between-component inequality is
then denoted as ετ (z;α; ρ) and defined simply by replacing γ by τ in (48).
2.6 Within- and between-component inequality revisited
Section 2.5 models the poverty and inequality impact of increasing the dis-
tance between each value of income component k and overall mean component
µ(k) at each percentile p. This is the traditional approach to this sort of inequality
decompositions. Increasing within- or between-group inequality affects all of the
values of a group’s incomes; similarly, increasing within- or between-component
inequality affects all of the values of an income component.
It is sometimes useful, however, to see how variations in an income component
k affects only the group with, say, a positive level of the component. It may indeed
be easier to implement policies that reduce income-source inequality only among
those who are already active in an economic sector. An alternative approach to
Section 2.5 would therefore be to increase the inequality in component k for only
a portion of the population, such as those with a positive value for component k
(e.g., those with a positive level of formal labor market earnings), or those that
also belong to some socio-demographic group (such as to consider the non-farm
income of rural households, for instance), or those whose total income falls below
some threshold (such as those below some poverty line).
9See Appendix 5 for a demonstration.
10See Appendix 6 for a demonstration.
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2.6.1 Truncated within-component inequality
For expositional simplicity, suppose therefore that we are interested in the
impact of increasing the earnings bipolarization of those actively engaged in the
labor market (and thus with a positive value of such earnings). Let ϕ(p; k) be the
proportion of individuals at percentile p that have a positive level of earnings, and
let ϕ(k) =
∫
ϕ(p; k)dp be the overall population share of those with positive earn-
ings11. Increasing bipolarization in those positive earnings amounts, at percentile
p, to increasing the distance between the expected earnings at p for those with
positive earnings, s(p; k)/ϕ(p; k), and the overall mean component of all those
with positive earnings, m(k) = µ(k)/ϕ(k). Expected income at percentile p after
such bipolarization is given by
Q(p; η∗(k)) = Q(p) + (η∗(k)− 1) (s(p; k)/ϕ(p; k)−m(k))ϕ(p; k) (69)
= Q(p) + (η∗(k)− 1) (s(p; k)−m(k)ϕ(p; k)) . (70)
This reduces to equation (50) when m(k)ϕ(p; k) is set to µ(k) — this occurs when
φ(p; k) is invariant to p. The impact of such bipolarization on the S-Gini is then12
∂I(ρ; η∗(k))
∂η∗(k)
∣∣∣∣
η∗(k)=1
= ψ(k) [IC (ρ; k)− IC (ρ;ϕ(p; k))] , (71)
and the impact on total FGT poverty is given by13:
∂P (z;α)
∂η∗(k)
=
{
αz−1µ(k)
[
P (z;α− 1; k)− CD(z;α; k)] if α > 0,
−f(z) (s(F (z); k)− ϕ(F (z); k)m(k)) if α = 0. (72)
The elasticity of total poverty with respect to within-component inequality is
then denoted as εη∗(k)(z;α; ρ), defined by replacing η by η∗(k) in (57) and using
(71) and (72).
2.6.2 Truncated between-component inequality
For between-component inequality, we wish to increase the distance between
the mean of all components, when the mean of a component is conditional on
11Note that this framework is general enough to allow for
∑
k ϕ(k) 6= 1, although ϕ(p, k) must
be within [0, 1].
12See Appendix 7 for a demonstration.
13See Appendix 7 for a demonstration.
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having a positive value of such a component. This should also maintain constant
overall mean income as well as the income component inequality of those with
a positive value of the component. To do this, we can use a bipolarization factor
τ ∗ to transform the expected value of income component k at p, s(p; k), to obtain
s(p; k; τ ∗):
s(p; k; τ ∗) = s(p; k)
(
1 + (τ ∗ − 1)
(
1− µ/
∑
k ϕ(k)
m(k)
))
. (73)
This leaves constant the level of inequality in component k among those with a
positive value of such a component since, in (73), the factor to the right of s(p; k)
is independent of p. Overall inequality in component k is also left unchanged by
this procedure since multiplying by a constant a null income component leaves
it unchanged. The overall mean is also kept constant — see Appendix 8 for a
demonstration. The combined effect of (73) on quantiles is given by
Q(p; τ ∗) = Q(p) +
K∑
k=1
s(p; k)
(
(τ ∗ − 1)
(
1− µ/
∑
k ϕ(k)
m(k)
))
. (74)
Note that if everyone has a positive level of each income component (and therefore
if ϕ(k) = 1 for all k), then (74) naturally reduces to (63).
The impact of a change in τ ∗ on the S-Gini is then14
∂I(ρ; τ ∗)
∂τ ∗
∣∣∣∣
τ∗=1
=
[
I −
K∑
k=1
ϕ(k)IC (ρ; k)∑
k ϕ(k)
]
, (75)
and its impact on poverty equals15
∂P (z;α; τ ∗)
∂τ ∗
= (76) α
[
P (z;α)− P (z;α− 1) + µ
z
∑
k ϕ(k)
∑K
k=1 ϕ(k)CD(z;α; k)
]
if α > 0,
−f(z)∑Kk=1 s(F (z); k)(1− µ/∑k ϕ(k)µ(k)/ϕ(k) ) if α = 0.
ετ∗(k)(z;α; ρ) is defined analogously to (35). Assume that each person has only
one non-null income component k, and that it serves to identify his membership
to a population subgroup g. The elasticities derived with the processes based on
η∗(k) and τ ∗ are then identical to those based on σ(g) and γ in equations (35) and
(48).
14See Appendix 8 for a demonstration.
15See Appendix 9.
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3 Illustration Using Nigerian Data
Some of the above analytical results are qualitatively unambiguous. Others,
however, cannot be signed a priori. All are a priori quantitatively dependent on
the empirical distribution of incomes and income components, and on their joint
distribution with membership in socio-economic groups. The results also depend
on the precise nature of the change in inequality that is being considered, and on
the parameters used to measure poverty and inequality.
It is thus useful to apply these analytical results to real data. To do this, we use
micro-data from the recent and nationally representative National Living Standard
Survey (NLSS) of Nigerian households, a survey that was carried out between
September 2003 and August 2004 by Nigeria’s National Bureau of Statistics.
Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa. Endowed with considerable oil
resources, it is also a country with very significant levels of inequality and where
absolute poverty is considerable. This makes Nigeria a natural environment in
which to be concerned about the link between poverty and inequality. Nigeria
is also one of the very few countries in Africa where incomes are surveyed, and
this is also important in motivating our choice of this particular African country.
(We are naturally conscious of the difficulties of measuring income accurately in
an economy such as Nigeria’s where the informal sector is very important.) Out
of the 22,200 households that were randomly selected in the NLSS, we removed
those that did not report their income components and that generated missing
values; 17764 observations were thus used for this application.
As is common for studies on Africa, we use per capita total household income
as a measure of living standards. Household observations are weighted by house-
hold size and sampling weights. Note that there is no official absolute poverty
line in Nigeria. The usual procedure for reporting on poverty in Nigeria is to use
a relative poverty line set to two-thirds of average living standard; this amounts
to about 15,000 Nigerian Naira (NG). Here, we will compare the results obtained
with this relative poverty line to those obtained when a “World Bank” poverty line
is used (about US$1 per day per capita, or around NG 50,000).
Table 1 shows poverty and inequality estimates across Nigeria’s six geopolit-
ical zones. Inequality and poverty seem considerable across all zones, with the
Gini index exceeding 0.5 and the poverty headcount rarely below 0.5, even with
the modest official relative poverty line of about US$0.30 a day. The Southern
zones come out as slightly less poor than the Northern ones16.
16A user-friendly Stata program to estimate the different impacts and elasticities reported in this
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We start by comparing the estimates of the analytical elasticities derived above
to those obtained by “simulating” in the sample the effect on poverty of changing
incomes from yi to yi + 0.01(yi − µ) for each observation i — this amounts to
increasing S-Gini inequality by 1%. The densities in the analytical formulae were
estimated using kernel regression — see for instance Silverman (1986). Panel
A of Figure 3 shows the elasticity of poverty to within-South-South inequality
(εσ(g)(z;α; ρ) in equation (35)) with α = 0 . The two sets of elasticities do not
differ very much on average, but the “simulated” ones are visibly much more vari-
able when α = 0. The elasticities are positive at the “official” relative poverty line
(around NG 15,000), but slightly negative when the one-dollar-a-day poverty line
(around NG 50,000) is used. Their numerical value is in particular very sensitive
to the poverty line when z is set lower than the official poverty line.
Such elasticities are also depicted in Panel B of Figure 3 for the poverty gap
index (α = 1). Increasing inequality increases the poverty gap with an elasticity
that is roughly identical across the analytical and simulated approaches, but that
is very sensitive to the value of the poverty line and that also differs significantly
from the poverty headcount elasticity. Similar results are displayed in Panels C
and D of Figure 3 for the poverty elasticities with respect to changes in within-
employment-income inequality, for α set to 0 and 1 respectively.
Table 2 shows the marginal impacts on poverty and inequality, as well as the
associated elasticities, of changing within- and between-group inequality. The re-
sults are again generally very sensitive to the choice of α and z. For α = 0 and z
set to two-thirds of average income, the impact (MIP ) on poverty of changing any
within-group inequality is smaller than for between-group inequality, and consid-
erably smaller if we measure the impact in terms of elasticities (ELS ). However,
when within-group inequality is changed for all groups simultaneously all groups
(the σ scheme), the marginal impact of changing within-group inequality is about
twice as large as for between-group inequality (the γ scheme). Moving from
z = 2/3µ to z = US$1 changes the sign of all but one of the impacts and of the
elasticities; poverty now decreases with an increase in inequality. Between-group
elasticities are typically numerically larger than within-group ones. They are also
almost always larger than the elasticity with respect to Nigeria-level inequality
(ελ(z;α; ρ)).
Also note in Table 2 the considerable heterogeneity in impact and elasticity
estimates that is visible across regional distributions, viz, across lines. This het-
erogeneity is present despite the fact that the same redistributive processes, the
paper is available at http://dasp.ecn.ulaval.ca/fgtelas/ela.htm .
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same inequality and poverty aversion parameters, and the same poverty lines are
applied across lines of a same column. The variability in distributive impacts
could not therefore be attributed here to such things as “differences in the quality
of growth”, or “differences in economic shocks”, or “differences in the nature of
distributive policies”. Instead, the heterogeneity arises entirely because of differ-
ences in the initial subgroup distributions.
Figure 4 plots estimates of the elasticity εσ(g)(z;α; ρ) of poverty with respect
to subgroup inequality, and of the elasticity εη∗(k)(z;α; ρ) of poverty with respect
to truncated within-employment-income inequality, both against values of the in-
equality aversion parameter ρ. The elasticities always increase with ρ, and are
particularly sensitive to the choice of ρ for changes in within-employment-income
inequality, for both α equal to 0 and equal to 1.
Panels A and C of Figure 5 show the sensitivity to z and to α of the impact on
poverty of total, within- and between-group changes in inequality. These are the
estimates of ∂P (z;α;λ)/∂λ in (14), ∂P (z;α;σ)/∂σ in (36) and ∂P (z;α; γ)/∂γ
in (47). Panels B and D of Figure 5 show the associated elasticities. Note inter
alia that the marginal impact of within-group inequality is sometimes greater,
sometimes smaller, than that of between-group inequality for α = 0 (Panel A).
From around z = NG 24,000, increasing within-group inequality leads to a fall
in poverty. For α = 1 (Panel C), increasing within-group inequality always leads
to a greater increase in poverty than increasing between-group inequality. The
elasticities (Panels B and D) are slightly more similar, but again changing the
value of the poverty line or of the parameter α changes the estimates significantly
and can also lead to a change in the ranking of the within- and between-group
elasticities.
Table 3 shows the impact and the elasticities of changing within- and between-
component inequality, and this, across components, poverty lines and parameters
α. The estimates vary again considerably, both in signs and in magnitude. For
α = 0 and z = US$ 1, increasing inequality in any income component decreases
the poverty headcount; the same is true for an increase in between-component
inequality. The results are reversed for lower values of z or for α = 1.
Table 4 presents similar statistics for the case of changes in the inequality
of positive income components. Many of the conclusions drawn from Table 3
obtain here too. The most important changes in the elasticities from Table 3 to
Table 4 concern Employment income, Agricultural income and Non-farm business
income. As for Table 3 and for z = US$ 1, in many cases increases in within and
in between-component inequality lead to reductions in the poverty headcount.
23
4 Conclusion
This paper provides tools to link inequality and poverty from a microeconomic
perspective. It focusses on both between- and within-group inequalities and on
socio-demographic and income source inequalities. Both the analytical frame-
work and the application to Nigerian data are meant to help understand better
some of the complex theoretical and empirical links between poverty and inequal-
ity.
Among some of the lessons drawn, we find that:
• Poverty-inequality elasticities can depend importantly on the initial distri-
bution of incomes. A corollary is that these elasticities will likely change as
the distribution of income evolves with time.
• The poverty impact of a broad change in within-group inequality is often
higher than that of a change in between-group inequality, suggesting that
policies that reduce within-group inequality may be more powerful than the
often-advocated policies intended to reduce between-group inequality.
• The usual choice of the headcount index to assess the outcome of antipoverty
policies can very well result in poverty-inequality findings that contrast with
those of other, more distribution-sensitive, ways to measure poverty.
• More generally, poverty elasticities can be sensitive to the assumptions
made in measuring inequality and poverty — in particular, to the assumed
inequality and poverty aversion parameters. The sign and the size of the
elasticities can also be highly sensitive to the choice of the poverty line,
particularly so when living standards are more highly concentrated around
the poverty line.
• Perhaps the main lesson is that the elasticity of poverty with respect to
changes in inequality can be very much context specific, and may depend
in particular on the type of changes considered. This also implies that the
response of poverty to growth may also be very much context specific.
Note finally that anti-poverty policies, and targeting schemes in particular, can
be expected to impact both on poverty and on inequality. It is left to future research
to see how this paper’s tools can help design policies that are effective at reducing
both simultaneously.
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Figure 1: Bipolarization and FGT poverty
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Figure 2: Effect of increased between-group inequality on distribution and poverty
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Appendix 1 Bipolarization and poverty
Recall that the post-bipolarization quantile is given by:
Q(p;λ) = Q(p) + (λ− 1) (Q(p)− µ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
increased bipolarization
. (A.1)
The FGT index being defined as:
P (z;α;λ) =
∫ 1
0
(
z −Q(p)− (λ− 1) (Q(p)− µ)
z
)α
+
dp (A.2)
we have, for α > 0,
∂P (z;α;λ)
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
λ=1
(A.3)
= α
∫ 1
0
(
z −Q(p) + (λ− 1)(µ−Q(p))
z
)α−1
+
∣∣∣∣∣
λ=1
(
µ−Q(p)
z
)
dp (A.4)
= α
∫ 1
0
(
z −Q(p)
z
)α−1
+
(
µ−Q(p) + z − z
z
)
dp (A.5)
= α
[∫ 1
0
(
z −Q(p)
z
)α
+
dp+
∫ 1
0
(
z −Q(p)
z
)α−1
+
(
µ− z
z
)
dp
]
(A.6)
= α
[
P (z;α) +
(
µ− z
z
)
P (z;α− 1)
]
. (A.7)
For α = 0, note first that through setting Q(p;λ) to z in (A.1) and using a change
of variable, P (z;α = 0;λ) can be expressed as
P (z;α = 0;λ) =
∫ (z+(λ−1)µ)/λ
−∞
dF (y). (A.8)
Supposing that F (y) is differentiable at (z+(λ−1)µ)/λ with density f((z+(λ−
1)µ)/λ), we then obtain:
∂P (z;α = 0;λ)
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
λ=1
=
[
µ− z
λ2
]
f
(
z + (λ− 1)µ
λ
)∣∣∣∣
λ=1
(A.9)
= −f(z)(z − µ). (A.10)
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Appendix 2 Between-group bipolarization and inequal-
ity
Following an increase in between-group bipolarisation, the expected income
of those initially at percentile p is given by
Q(p; γ) = Q(p) +
G∑
g=1
∫
(γ − 1)
(
1− µ
µ(g)
)
. (A.11)
The S-Gini index then becomes
I(ρ; γ) = (A.12)
µ−1
G∑
g=1
∫ [
µ−
[
Q(p)
(
1 + (γ − 1)
(
1− µ
µ(g)
))]]
ω(p; ρ)φ(p; g)dp. (A.13)
We then have:
∂I(ρ; γ)
∂γ
∣∣∣∣
γ=1
(A.14)
= µ−1
G∑
g=1
∫ 1
0
[−Q(p)]
(
1− µ
µ(g)
)
ω(p; ρ)φ(p; g)dp (A.15)
= µ−1
G∑
g=1
∫ 1
0
[−µ(g)]
(
1− µ
µ(g)
)
ω(p; ρ)φ(p; g)dp (A.16)
+µ−1
G∑
g=1
(
1− µ
µ(g)
)∫
[µ(g)−Q(p)]ω(p; ρ)φ(p; g)dp (A.17)
= µ−1
G∑
g=1
∫ 1
0
[µ− µ(g)]ω(p; ρ)φ(p; g)dp (A.18)
+
G∑
g=1
φ(g)
(
µ(g)− µ
µ
)
IC (ρ; g) (A.19)
= IC (ρ) +
G∑
g=1
(
µ(g)
µ
− 1
)
IC (ρ; g), (A.20)
where IC (ρ) is the coefficient of concentration obtained when everyone is given
his group income.
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Appendix 3 Between-group bipolarization and poverty
Following an increase in between-group bipolarisation, the expected income
of those in group g initially at percentile p is given by
Q(p; g; γ) = Q(p)
(
1 + (γ − 1)
(
1− µ
µ(g)
))
. (A.21)
For α ≥ 1, we then have that the change in group-g’s FGT poverty index can be
expressed as
∂P (z;α; g; γ)
∂γ
∣∣∣∣
γ=1
(A.22)
= α(zφ(g))−1
∫ 1
0
(
z −Q(p)
z
)α−1
+
(
µ
µ(g)
− 1
)
Q(p)φ(p; g)dp (A.23)
= α(zφ(g))−1
(
µ
µ(g)
− 1
)∫ 1
0
(
z −Q(p)
z
)α−1
+
(Q(p) + z − z)φ(p; g)dp (A.24)
= α
(
µ
µ(g)
− 1
)
[zP (z;α− 1; g)− P (z;α; g)] . (A.25)
Since the total FGT index is given by
P (z;α) =
G∑
g=1
φ(g)P (z;α; g), (A.26)
we have that
∂P (z;α; γ)
∂γ
∣∣∣∣
γ=1
= α
G∑
g=1
φ(g)
(
µ
µg
− 1
)
[zP (z;α− 1; g))− P (z;α; g)] .(A.27)
For α = 0, we find
∂P (z;α = 0; g; γ)
∂γ
∣∣∣∣
γ=1
= −f(z; g)
(
µg − µ
µg
)
(A.28)
and therefore we have that
∂P (z;α = 0; γ)
∂γ
∣∣∣∣
γ=1
=
G∑
g=1
φ(g)f(z; g)
(
µ− µg
µg
)
. (A.29)
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Appendix 4 Within-component bipolarization and poverty
Following an increase in the bipolarization of component k, the expected in-
come of those originally at percentile p becomes
Q(p; η(k)) = Q(p) + (η(k)− 1) (s(p; k)− µ(k)) . (A.30)
For α > 0, we thus find
∂P (z;α; η(k))
∂η(k)
∣∣∣∣
η(k)=1
= α
∫ 1
0
(
z −Q(p)
z
)α−1
+
(
µ(k)− s(p; k)
z
)
dp (A.31)
= αµ(k)
[
P (z;α− 1)− CD(z;α; k)] , (A.32)
whereCD(z;α; k) is Makdissi and Wodon (2002)’s normalizedCD curve for com-
ponent k:
CD(z;α; k) =
∫ 1
0
(
z −Q(p)
z
)α−1
+
s(p; k)
µ(k)
dp. (A.33)
For α = 0, we obtain:
∂P (z;α = 0; η(k))
∂η(k)
= −f(z)(s(F (z); k)− µ(k)). (A.34)
Appendix 5 Between-component bipolarization and
inequality
The expected income of those initially at percentile p becomes
Q(p; τ) = Q(p) +
K∑
k=1
s(p; k)
(
(τ − 1)
(
1− µ/K
µ(k)
))
(A.35)
after a between-component increase in polarization. The S-Gini index then be-
comes:
I(ρ; τ) =
µ−1
∫ [
µ−
[
Q(p) +
K∑
k=1
s(p; k)(τ − 1)
(
1− µ/K
µ(k)
)]]
ω(p; ρ)dp,(A.36)
35
and we therefore have that
∂I(ρ; τ)
∂τ
∣∣∣∣
τ=1
= µ−1
∫ 1
0
K∑
k=1
s(p; k)
1
K
(
µ
µ(k)
−K
)
ω(p; ρ)dp (A.37)
= µ−1
∫ 1
0
(
K∑
k=1
s(p; k)µ
Kµ(k)
−Q(p) + µ− µ
)
ω(p; ρ)dp (A.38)
= I(ρ) +
1
K
∫ 1
0
K∑
k=1
(
s(p; k)
µ(k)
− 1
)
ω(p; ρ)dp (A.39)
= I(ρ)− 1
K
µ(k)−1
∫ 1
0
K∑
k=1
(µ(k)− s(p; k))ω(p; ρ)dp (A.40)
=
[
I(ρ)−
K∑
k=1
IC (ρ; k)
K
]
. (A.41)
Appendix 6 Between-component bipolarization and
poverty
Using (63) to define P (z;α; τ), we find for α > 0 that
∂P (z;α; τ)
∂τ
∣∣∣∣
τ=1
(A.42)
= αz−1
∫ 1
0
(
z −Q(p)
z
)α−1
+
K∑
k=1
(
µ/K
µ(k)
− 1
)
s(p; k)dp (A.43)
= αz−1
∫ 1
0
(
z −Q(p)
z
)α−1
+
(
K∑
k=1
s(p; k)µ/K
µ(k)
−Q(p)
)
dp (A.44)
= α
[
P (z;α)− P (z;α− 1) + µ
z
K∑
k=1
CD(z;α; k)
K
]
. (A.45)
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For α = 0, the impact of between-component bipolarization on poverty equals
∂P (z;α = 0; τ)
∂τ
∣∣∣∣
τ=1
= −f(z)
K∑
k=1
s(F (z); k)
(
1− µ/K
µ(k)
)
. (A.46)
Appendix 7 Truncated within-component bipolariza-
tion
Following an increase in the bipolarization of positive values of component k,
the expected income of those originally at percentile p becomes
Q(p; η∗(k)) = Q(p) + (η∗(k)− 1) (s(p; k)−m(k)ϕ(p; k)) . (A.47)
This leads to:
I(ρ; η∗(k)) (A.48)
= µ−1
∫
[µ− (Q(p) + (η∗(k)− 1)(s(p; k)−m(k)ϕ(p; k)))]ω(p; ρ)dp. (A.49)
Thus,
∂I(ρ; η∗(k))
∂η∗(k)
∣∣∣∣
η∗(k)=1
= µ−1
∫
(m(k)ϕ(p; k)− s(p; k))ω(p; ρ)dp
= ψ(k)IC (ρ; k) + µ−1
∫
(ϕ(p; k)m(k)− µ(k))ω(p; ρ)dp
= ψ(k)IC (ρ; k)− µ(k)
µϕ(k)
∫
(ϕ(k)− ϕ(p; k))ω(p; ρ)dp
= ψ(k) [IC (ρ; k)− IC (ρ;ϕ(p; k))] . (A.50)
37
For α > 0, the impact of this on poverty equals
∂P (z;α; η∗(k))
∂η∗(k)
∣∣∣∣
η∗(k)=1
(A.51)
= α
∫ 1
0
(
z −Q(p)
z
)α−1
+
(
m(k)ϕ(p; k)− s(p; k)
z
)
dp (A.52)
= αz−1m(k)ϕ(k)
∫ 1
0
(
z −Q(p)
z
)α−1
+
(
ϕ(p; k)
ϕ(k)
− s(p; k)
ϕ(k)m(k)
)
dp (A.53)
= αz−1µ(k)
[
P (z;α− 1; k)− CDk(z;α; k)
]
. (A.54)
For α = 0, the impact on poverty becomes:
∂P (z;α = 0; η∗(k))
∂η∗(k)
= −f(z) (s(F (z); k)− ϕ(F (z); k)m(k)) . (A.55)
Appendix 8 Truncated between-component bipolar-
ization and inequality
An increase in the between-component bipolarization of those with positive
values of such components makes the expected incomes of those at percentile p
become
Q(p; τ ∗) = Q(p) +
K∑
k=1
s(p; k)
(
(τ ∗ − 1)
(
1− µ/
∑
k ϕ(k)
µ(k)/ϕ(k)
))
. (A.56)
Average income is left unchanged by this transformation:∫ 1
0
Q(p; τ ∗)dp (A.57)
=
∫ 1
0
Q(p)dp+
K∑
k=1
(τ ∗ − 1)
(
1− µ/
∑K
k ϕ(k)
µ(k)/ϕ(k)
)∫ 1
0
s(p; k)dp(A.58)
= µ+ (τ ∗ − 1)
K∑
k=1
(
µ(k)− ϕ(k)µ∑K
k ϕ(k)
)
(A.59)
= µ. (A.60)
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The associated S-Gini index then equals:
I(ρ; τ ∗) = (A.61)
µ−1
∫ [
µ−
[
Q(p) +
K∑
k=1
s(p; k)(τ ∗ − 1)
(
1− µ/
∑
k ϕ(k)
µ(k)/ϕ(k)
)]]
ω(p; ρ)dp.(A.62)
We then have:
∂I(ρ; τ ∗)
∂τ ∗
∣∣∣∣
τ∗=1
= µ−1
∫ 1
0
K∑
k=1
s(p; k)
(
µ/
∑
k ϕ(k)
µ(k)/ϕ(k)
− 1
)
ω(p; ρ)dp (A.63)
= µ−1
∫ 1
0
(
K∑
k=1
s(p; k)
µ/
∑
k ϕ(k)
µ(k)/ϕ(k)
−Q(p) + µ− µ
)
ω(p; ρ)dp (A.64)
= I(ρ) +
∫ 1
0
(
K∑
k=1
s(p; k)
ϕ(k)/
∑
k ϕ(k)
µ(k)
− 1
)
ω(p; ρ)dp (A.65)
= I(ρ) +
∫ 1
0
K∑
k=1
ϕ(k)∑
k ϕ(k)
(
s(p; k)
µ(k)
− 1
)
ω(p; ρ)dp (A.66)
=
[
I(ρ)−
K∑
k=1
ϕ(k)IC (ρ; k)∑
k ϕ(k)
]
. (A.67)
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Appendix 9 Truncated between-component bipolar-
ization and poverty
Using (A.56) to define P (z;α; τ ∗), we find for α > 0 that
∂P (z;α; τ ∗)
∂τ ∗
∣∣∣∣
τ∗=1
(A.68)
= αz−1
∫ 1
0
(
z −Q(p)
z
)α−1
+
K∑
k=1
(
µ/
∑
k ϕ(k)
µ(k)/ϕ(k)
− 1
)
s(p; k)dp (A.69)
= αz−1
∫ 1
0
(
z −Q(p)
z
)α−1
+
(
K∑
k=1
µ/
∑
k ϕ(k)
µ(k)/ϕ(k)
s(p; k)−Q(p)
)
dp (A.70)
= α
[
P (z;α)− P (z;α− 1) + µ
z
∑
k ϕ(k)
K∑
k=1
ϕ(k)CD(z;α; k)
]
. (A.71)
For α = 0, the impact on poverty of an increase in between-component bipolar-
ization of those with positive component value is finally given by
∂P (z;α = 0; τ ∗)
∂τ ∗
∣∣∣∣
τ∗=1
= −f(z)
K∑
k=1
s(F (z); k)
(
1− µ/
∑
k ϕ(k)
µ(k)/ϕ(k)
)
(A.72)
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